Review of "My Brain Made Me Do It: The Rise of Neuroscience and the Threat to Moral Responsibility" more

Book Reviews am astonished that it receives such remarkable commendation from other authors in the Intelligent Design tradition; for Guillermo Gonzalez to write that ‘I am not exaggerating too much to say that this book is in the same class as the works of genius its authors describe’ is in my judgement ridiculous. This is a tragedy, for most of the readers of this journal will agree with the main conclusion of the book, that the universe is full of meaning and purpose, and that science properly understood confirms rather than challenges that verdict. It is an argument that deserves to be better made – and has been, for example by Alister McGrath (The Re-enchantment of Nature – Science, Religion and the Human Sense of Wonder; London, Hodder and Stoughton, 2002). Paul Wraight has retired from teaching physics and electronics at Aberdeen University and is pursuing among other interests the relevance of cosmology to Christian belief. (19). Interestingly enough, Sternberg’s case is not a compatibilist position; a theory that seeks to show how physical determination and human freedom are compatible. He differs from compatibilism because compatibilism defines freedom as ‘having alternate choices available’ and he defines it as ‘the extent to which my mind controls my actions, regardless of what choices happen to be available’ (41). He asks the pertinent question: ‘Do I control my decisions or does my brain?’ (23). Is what the brain does sufficient or insufficient to determine any given act? Biological determinism, upheld by many scientists and philosophers – including Francis Crick, Joseph LeDoux, Mark Hallett, Richard Rorty, Pierre Laplace, and Paul and Patricia Churchland – is growing the further we understand the physical processes of the brain. It has ‘been fruitful in science,’ according to Sternberg, since it ‘provides a basis for projectile motion, collisions, elasticity, and movements of planets’ (29). This basis would not be there if the world behaved randomly on a macroscopic level, since there would be no way to have controlled measurements or provide reliable predictions. Science simply cannot function without some sense of determinism; the extent to which people, brains, and other physical objects are determined is the central question. The randomness of quantum events, discovered by Copenhagen and Bohr, cannot and should not be used to argue for human responsibility since ‘we also cannot be held accountable for our actions if they are caused by random events’ (34). We would have to discover something more than quantum indeterminateness and randomness to show humans are morally accountable. So what justifies belief in human freedom and moral responsibility? For Sternberg, freedom lies in ‘the ability of a person’s conscious self to control his or her thoughts and actions’ (36), and the justification may lie in our common-sense Eliezer Sternberg My Brain Made Me Do It: The Rise of Neuroscience and the Threat to Moral Responsibility Amherst: N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 2010. 244 pp. pb. £10.99. ISBN-13 9781616141653 A recent graduate of Brandeis, who majored in neuroscience and philosophy, has produced a book that reads as if an experienced professor wrote it. Although his beginning is like John Calvin – writing a book at an early age – he argues in opposition to Calvin by calling for a moral responsibility in light of human freedom. This freedom shows up in the fact that ‘the agent can navigate his inner world of experience in any way he chooses,’ and this is what ‘distinguishes us from machines and from animals’ (198). Sternberg’s argument is that ‘though the threat of neuroscience to free will and moral responsibility is strong, there is a way they can be reconciled’ Science & Christian Belief, Vol 22, No. 2 • 199 Book Reviews experience of controlling our actions and thoughts. I may decide to pick up a pen on the ground or I may not. But, as many eliminative materialists say, common sense and folk understandings of freedom do not justify belief in free will. Sternberg argues that certain deep, troubling moral considerations – like Jean Valjean’s torment over whether to turn himself in or not – ‘suggests to us that he has freedom of the will’ (47). This is related to the notion of moral introspection, conscious deliberation, and lament, whereby an agent freely chooses between options, even where there are no rules to go by (only existential concerns). Sternberg goes on to analyse two popular theories of mind: dualism and emergence. For Sternberg dualism ‘doesn’t hold water as a theory’ and emergence ‘doesn’t help the case for free will and moral responsibility’ because ‘an emergent property may be more than the sum of its parts, but it is still determined by its parts’ (49). So how can one escape these two positions? Modern findings in neuroscience indicate the level to which the brain determines behaviour: just think of Tourette’s syndrome, Parkinson’s disease, Huntington’s chorea, alien hand syndrome, obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD), forced hyperphasia, and schizophrenia as examples. Many neuroscientists have used these as evidence for the direct correlation between brain and bodily behaviour. They speak of ‘executive functioning’ instead of ‘free will’. The executive functioning, they say, is located in the frontal lobe; the area where the brain ‘coordinates actions that reflect the knowledge and goals stored in memory’ (63). For Sternberg, ‘there is no doubt that, without a healthy brain, we would not have free will. That doesn’t mean that free will is equivalent to the operation of the frontal lobe – only that it depends on it’ (64). So if freedom is not located in some immaterial, irreducible substance or soul, or as an emergent property, where is it located? As far as I can tell Sternberg does not 200 answer this question. It might be what he would call a boundless question; one that is extremely hard to disentangle, identify and locate. He ends his work on a positive note saying that we [those in neuroscience] ‘are up to the task’ (199). I would agree with him in so far as neuroscience is rapidly growing and may someday provide a suitable answer that can be agreed upon. But this may be impossible as well. Arthur Schopenhauer rightly called this issue (the mind-brain problem) the ‘world-knot’ (Weltknoten) and it is obvious just how tight this knot is tied. Sternberg does a great job in clarifying and analysing this knot. His usage of life examples and metaphors allows the reader to follow his train of thought easily. He may need to further his approach by attempting a constructive argument for how neuronal activity and human freedom relate, but for what it is worth, Sternberg does a great job. Kile Jones is a PhD student at Claremont School of Theology and holds a Masters of Theological Studies (M.T.S.) and a Masters of Sacred Theology (S.T.M.) from Boston University. Fraser Watts & Kevin Dutton (eds.) Why the Science and Religion Dialogue Matters: Voices from the International Society for Science and Religion Philadelphia & London: Templeton Foundation Press, 2006. 158pp. pb. $19.95. ISBN 13: 978-1-59947-103-7 & 10: 1-59947-103-5 The title for this collection of essays, emerging from contributors across the continents and the major religious traditions, is well chosen. No impartial reader could come away from this book with an indifferent attitude to the science and religion dialogue. In the context of the ecological crisis (to which the use of technology has contributed), and a socially and politically fragmented world order (in which religion is entangled), the stakes are high and the conversation • Science & Christian Belief, Vol 22, No. 2